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Abstract — A seemingly endless series of scandals has focused 
increasing public attention on the issue of doping among elite 
athletes. But we still do not know how many elite athletes really 
make use of banned drugs. In addition, we recognize the 
literature suffers a lack of appropriate game theory models for 
complex social interactions related to doping. Therefore, we 
think that an agent-based approach may allow doping behavior 
patterns in professional sports to be explored and elucidated. 
We conceptualize an agent-based model on three interacting 
objectives, namely (i) elite athletes, (ii) anti-doping laboratory 
and (iii) anti-doping agency. The latter agency announces anti-
doping rules and imposes penalties; the anti-doping laboratory 
executes doping controls and elite athletes compete for income. 
In particular, we focus on presenting an agent-based concept to 
analyze elite athletes’ doping behavior. Using such an agent-
based framework and computational simulations may lead in 
the future to policy recommendations for the fight against 
doping. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
S LONG as competitive professional sports exist the 
phenomenon of using illicit methods like doping will 
remain. However, in modern times doping has gained more 
and more public attention since the astonishing death of 
cyclist Knud Jensen at the Olympic Games of 1960. The 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has shown the rate of 
Adverse Analytical Findings is approximately 1% in recent 
years [1]. But banned substances and methods may not be 
detectable and effective doping controls may not be feasible, 
e.g. because of their enormous costs in economic terms. 
Therefore, we believe, in line with [2]-[3], that [1] 
underestimates the true extent of doping behavior in elite 
sports. Recent research activities in this field are based on 
various methods to approximate the extent of doping but 
estimates differ widely. To begin with, [4] make use of 
projection-methods and estimate the extent of doping as 
approximately 72%. Applying a forensic approach, [5] 
analyze 7,289 blood samples collected from 2,737 athletes. 
The authors detect abnormal blood profiles and calculate the 
extent of blood doping as approximately 14% [5]. In a world 
wide web survey, [6] ask 448 German elite athletes about 
their doping behavior, making use of a randomized response 
                                                          
This study was conducted independently of funding from any 
organization. 
technique to ensure that answers are anonymous. The 
authors present a lower interval limit of 25.8% and an upper 
limit of 48.1% for the use of banned substances or methods 
by German elite athletes [6]. Also applying a randomized 
response technique, [7] conduct a study of 1,394 
international top athletes and find the extent of doping is 
approximately 6.8%. To sum up, we find in the literature 
estimations for extents of doping in a range of 1% to 72% 
[1]-[7]. Further investigations also differ in the extent of 
doping estimated, which supports our notion that identifying 
the real extent of doping is a complex problem [8]-[13]. 
 
 To address this problem of complexity in professional 
sports doping researchers have developed various game 
theory models based on rational choice theory [14]-[17]. A 
common feature of these models is to depict doping behavior 
patterns in professional sports. But we think that these 
models exhibit a low degree of complexity because of 
analytical solvability.  
 
 Therefore, the main purpose of the paper is to address the 
complexity problem by presenting an agent-based concept to 
analyze elite athletes’ doping behavior. If we have no clue 
what the real extent of doping may be how can we provide 
reliable policy recommendations? An agent-based approach 
might allow determining detected as well as undetected 
dopers within populations of elite athletes under varying 
environmental conditions. We describe below an agent-
based framework that may serve in the future as a basis for 
generating simulation results and follow-up contributions. 
For instance, we incorporate elite athletes’ decisions that 
affect more than one time period; an issue frequently 
neglected in the literature and which allows the investigation 
of lapse-of-time effects.  
 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section 
presents a brief literature overview of game theory models 
that describe doping behavior patterns in professional sports, 
with a focus on strategic and inspection games. The third 
section proposes an agent-based concept to analyze elite 
athletes’ doping behavior. The final section discusses 
implications and provides an outlook. 
A 
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II.  LITERATURE OVERVIEW OF GAME THEORY MODELS 
A. Strategic Games 
In this subsection we survey briefly a series of game theory 
models that make use of strategic interactions based on 
rational choice theory to elucidate doping behavior patterns 
in sports. The seminal paper [14] appeared in 1987 and by a 
simple and simultaneous game theory model similar to a 
prisoner’s dilemma situation describes an athlete’s doping 
decision. The authors’ so-called ‘doping dilemma’ consists 
of two rational-acting athletes endowed with identical 
characteristics who have to decide independently from each 
other to dope or not to dope. To do so, the athletes make use 
of an expected utility maximization approach as follows. An 
athlete decides to dope if her expected utility is higher in the 
case of doping abuse compared to the abandonment of 
doping. Therefore, athletes take benefits and costs of doping 
into account. The author concludes that without an anti-
doping control, checked in turn by an international 
inspection procedure, the doping problem cannot be 
eliminated. In the case such a strategy does not work within 
a few years the legalization of doping is the only solution. 
To our best knowledge [18] implements for the very first 
time a doping-control-scheme in strategic games to verify if 
athletes act rule-consistently so that detected doping athletes 
may be punished. Two interacting athletes make use of a 
linear expected utility function concerning whether to take 
banned substances or not. Although the authors invent a 
novel doping-control-scheme, their focus is on strategic 
interactions among athletes because of controls conducted at 
random and not on the basis of a specific decision-making 
process. The authors find that, beyond the investments made 
in the dope-testing system, other factors, such as prevention 
measures, the number of events and the prizes offered, have 
a non-negligible effect on doping behavior in elite sports.  
Contrary to the assumption in both strategic games above, 
[19] assumes that athletes do not have an identical chance to 
win a competition. Hence, the author creates two artificial 
athletes endowed with heterogeneous characteristics and, 
therefore, having an unequal probability to win a 
competition even under identical conditions. The result is 
that ranking-based punishments are less costly and more 
effective than the regulations announced by the International 
Olympic Committee. Further, based on [19], ‘unpublished’ 
[20] develop an evolutionary doping game considering more 
than one time period. The authors find situations where, in 
theory, all athletes either break anti-doping rules or act 
totally rule-consistently. Furthermore, the authors provide 
evidence that highly talented athletes are more likely to dope 
than athletes with a lower degree of talent. 
Reference [16] evolves a symmetric strategic game that 
takes two athletes into account who are endowed with 
homogeneous characteristica. The author aims to determine 
the influences of prize-money distributions and likelihoods 
to detect doping behavior. As an extension, [21] examines 
up to four athletes and focuses on comparisons between 
linear and non-linear prize-money distributions. While linear 
prize-money distributions lead to situations in which all 
athletes act (non-) rule-compliantly, non-linear prize-money 
distributions lead to more complex situations. Reference 
[22] refers to [16] as well as [21] and implements so-called 
‘fair play norms’ like pre-play communication about doping 
and formal anti-doping agreements, which may induce 
higher compliance levels with anti-doping rules. 
Reference [23] evolves an asymmetric strategic game 
within athletes’ performance that depends on individual 
talent, or rather, constitution. An athlete may make use of 
legal activities like training or may resort to banned and 
illicit substances. In consequence athletes can enhance their 
performance and thereby improve their competition result. 
The author examines effective strength of doping 
substances, doping costs, and income effects with respect to 
the influence on an athlete’s decision to dope or not to dope. 
The author identifies costs, likelihoods and base-salary 
effects that deviate athletes from doping abandonment. 
Reference ‘unpublished’ [24] provides an asymmetric 
strategic game appropriate to consider any desired number 
of athletes. The author models a ‘winner-takes-all’ effect, 
i.e. only the winner of a competition receives prize-money. 
Such an extreme prize-money distribution seems to be 
responsible for the finding that incentives to dope decrease if 
the number of athletes in competition increases. In addition, 
‘unpublished’ [24] deduces an optimal – in the sense of 
economic costs – quantum of doping controls if athletes are 
selected at random for testing. 
B. Inspection Games 
In this subsection we overview briefly inspection games 
applied to doping behavior, a recent development in game 
theory that [15] launched in 2002. It is important to 
distinguish between strategic and inspection games insofar 
as inspection games feature an institution which conducts 
doping controls on the basis of specific decision-making 
processes. After interactions among athletes in competition 
have taken place, an institution conducts doping controls. 
Thus, inspection games focus mainly on interactions 
between athletes and a doping-control institution whereas 
strategic games illuminate interactions among athletes. In 
the seminal paper on inspection games [15] shows that 
increasing fines leads to a higher level of rule-compliance.  
Reference ‘unpublished’ [25] models characteristica very 
similar to those modeled in [15] and presents an institution 
that conducts doping controls as facing two kinds of error. 
On the one hand a doped athlete is not detected despite being 
tested (error of the first kind) and on the other hand a clean 
athlete may be erroneously found guilty of taking banned 
substances (error of the second kind). The author finds that 
an athlete’s optimal choice – with respect to maximization of 
expected payoffs – depends on the preferences of the 
institution in terms of how to conduct dope controls and on 
the quality of those controls. 
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Reference [17] extends [19] with respect to a doping-
control institution that decides subsequently to the 
competition whether to test the winner or not. Hence, the 
authors extend a strategic game to obtain an inspection 
game. Recall that the basic model, i.e. [19], consists of two 
athletes; a winner and a looser. Among other things, the 
doping-control institution takes information into account 
from the losing athlete, the so-called ‘whistleblower’ [17]. 
The authors conclude that whistleblowing reduces economic 
costs of doping controls, since testing athletes is costly. 
Reference ‘unpublished’ [26] provides an extension of an 
inspection game model. The authors model three steps, 
which are, (i) competitions among athletes, (ii) doping 
controls, and (iii) decisions of customers or sponsors. The 
latter step is innovative and concerns in particular customers 
or sponsors’ point of view with respect to their option to 
withdraw their financial support after a doping scandal. The 
authors find that doping controls should be carried out by an 
independent institution. A doping-control institution that 
depends on the financial support of customers or sponsors 
has no incentive to detect doping athletes. 
To summarize, we surveyed briefly more than ten 
contributions to game theory models of doping behavior 
patterns. We find that the strategic and inspection models 
above often consider fewer than four athletes; a feature far 
from reality in professional sports. Reference ‘unpublished’ 
[24] is an exception that allows any desired number of 
athletes to be considered. However, game theory models 
applied to doping have a low degree of complexity. 
Therefore, we propose in the following section an agent-
based concept to analyze an elite athletes’ doping behavior. 
III. AGENT-BASED CONCEPT 
A. Aims and Basics 
In line with the literature we think that agent-based modeling 
has potential as a ‘third way’ of doing social science in 
addition to argumentation and formalization [27]. Reference 
[28] provides a toolkit for agent-based modeling and 
computational economics. Reference [29] overviews agent-
based modeling applied to economic problems and social 
dilemmas. Reference [30] presents recent advances in 
computational econophysics including agent-based 
econophysics. Making use of agent-based modeling we are 
able to formalize theories on complex social processes like 
doping behavior patterns in professional sports. Thus, 
modeling a high degree of complexity is an essential 
advantage of an agent-based approach compared to game 
theory models. 
Note that we do not aim to present an agent-based model 
of doping behavior for the purpose of estimating or 
predicting the real extent of doping in professional sports. 
Instead, we intend to model a complex social system to test 
how parameters – e.g. bans, fines, prize-money distributions 
and subjective detection probabilities – may influence elite 
athletes’ doping behavior and how policymakers may fight 
against doping.  
Our multi-period agent-based doping concept is based on 
three interacting objectives, namely, (i) elite athletes, (ii) an 
anti-doping laboratory, and (iii) an anti-doping agency. The 
agency announces anti-doping rules and imposes fines as 
well as bans. Anti-doping laboratory executes doping 
controls whereby control frequency and efficiency are 
imperfect, so that not every doped and tested elite athlete is 
detected as a dope user. In each time period any elite athlete 
competes for income in a rank-order tournament. We assume 
that using dope increases an elite athlete’s chance of success 
in rank-order tournaments in the short term but such an 
illegal practice causes an adverse reaction in the long term. 
To put it differently, in the long term the harm caused to 
elite athletes by doping is higher than the benefits. We 
justify such an adverse reaction to doping in terms of 
potential health risks. However, in the following subsections 
we introduce key parameters and explain in detail our three 
interacting objectives (i) elite athletes, (ii) anti-doping 
laboratory, and (iii) anti-doping agency. 
B. Anti-doping Agency 
We create an ‘artificial’ anti-doping agency within our 
agent-based concept to reflect the ‘real world’ institution, i.e. 
the WADA. The anti-doping agency announces anti-doping 
rules the elite athletes have to comply with. Hence, the anti-
doping agency sets a Complexity of Anti-doping Rules 
(CAR). Furthermore, the anti-doping agency determines 
pecuniary levels of FINes (FIN) and states BANs (BAN). 
Thus, detected dope-taking athletes face a system of 
punishment that consists of fines paid in Tokens and bans 
with respect to time periods an elite athlete is forbidden to 
participate in rank-order tournaments. The maximum 
number of time periods applied, i.e. the maximum ban 
(maxban), depends on minimum and maximum age (minage, 
maxage) within a population of elite athletes. Table I 
provides characteristica of parameters and attributes used in 
our agent-based doping concept. 
At the end of any time period the anti-doping agency 
publishes statistics on doping. In particular, we aim at 
calculating figures like the Share of DEtected elite athletes 
(SDE), the Share of DOped elite athletes (SDO) and the 
Share of Detected and Doped elite athletes (SDD).  
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TABLE I. 
AGENT-BASED DOPING MODEL: CHARACTERISTICA OF PARAMETERS AND ATTRIBUTES 
Parameter / Attribute Abbreviation Characteristica 
 
Anti-doping Agency 
Complexity of Anti-doping Rules CAR [0;1] Exogenous 
FINes FIN [0; ∞] Exogenous 
BAN BAN [0; maxban] Exogenous 
Anti-doping Laboratory 
  Number of Tested elite Athletes NTA [0; N] Exogenous 
  Number of Preannounced-tested elite Athletes NPA [0; N] Exogenous 
  Number of Randomly-tested elite Athletes NRA NTA-NPA Exogenous 
  Control EFficiency  CEF [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Number of Controlled Periods NCP [1; ∞] Exogenous 
Share of DEtected elite athletes SDE [0; 1] Endogenous 
Share of DOped elite athletes SDO [0; 1] Endogenous 
Share of Detected and Doped elite athletes SDD [0; 1] Endogenous 
Elite Athletes 
  Population of elite athletes N [1, ∞] Exogenous 
  Identification number I [1, N] Exogenous 
  AGe AG [minage; maxage] Endogenous 
  Behavioral-Type BT [A; B; C; D] Exogenous 
  PErformance PE [0, maxperformance] Endogenous 
  FItness FI [0; 100] Endogenous 
  COnstitution CO [0; 100] Endogenous 
  DIsturbance DI [0; 100] Endogenous 
  INcome IN [-∞; maxprize] Endogenous 
  Income due to Detected doping  ID [-∞; maxprize] Endogenous 
  Income due to Undetected doping  IU [-DC; maxprize] Endogenous 
  Doping Decision DD [+; -] Endogenous 
  Realized Rank in tournament RR [0; N] Endogenous 
  Doping Costs DC [0; ∞] Exogenous 
  Doping Efficiency  DE [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Doping Harm DH [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Prize-Money PM [0; maxprize] Endogenous 
  Weighting of Fitness WF [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Weighting of Constitution WC [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Weighting of Disturbance WD [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Time index T [0; ∞] Endogenous 
  Weighting of doping Efficiency WE [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Weighting of doping Harm WH [0; 1] Exogenous 
  Expected Utility   EU  [0; 1] Endogenous 
  Subjective detection Probability   SP  [0; 1] Endogenous 
  Risk Perception   RP  [0; 1] Endogenous 
  Size of an elite athletes’ social Network   SN  [1; N] Exogenous 
  Number of periods an elite athlete has to act Rule-compliant   NR  [0; maxage-minage] Exogenous 
Note: Table I offers an overview of characteristica used within the agent-based concept sorted according to (i) anti-doping agency, (ii) anti-doping 
laboratory, and (iii) elite athletes. The first column displays the parameters or attributes; the second column shows related abbreviations, and the last column 
presents characteristica with respect to the domain and whether the parameter or attribute is determined endogenous or exogenous. 
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C. Anti-doping Laboratory 
We suppose an ‘artificial’ anti-doping laboratory that 
conducts doping controls according to anti-doping rules 
announced by the anti-doping agency for the whole 
population of N elite athletes. In each time period doping 
controls are carried out as follows. Immediately after a rank-
order tournament some participants are selected for testing 
so that we obtain a Number of Tested elite Athletes (NTA). 
Note that the number of tested elite athletes is made up of 
two terms. First, we assume a Number of Preannounced-
tested elite Athletes (NPA) in the sense that participants are 
always tested if they achieve preannounced placements in a 
rank-order tournament – usually placements near the winner, 
for instance, winners of medals at the Olympic Games are 
always tested. Second, we suppose a Number of Randomly-
tested elite Athletes (NRA), reflecting doping controls at 
random to ensure that doped elite athletes face the risk of 
being caught and punished regardless of their placement in 
the rank-order tournament. Equation (1) guarantees some 
randomly tested elite athletes will be selected, since 
otherwise a feasible strategy for doped participants is to 
achieve placement NPA +1 so that any risk of being tested 
and caught is circumvented. Thus, Equation (1) is necessary 
and sufficient to generate deterrence of the use of banned 
substances. 
0 NPANTANRA                           (1) 
Numbers of tested and preannounced-tested elite athletes can 
be freely selected according to Equation (1) before executing 
the source code to obtain simulation results. Eventually, in 
analogy with the literature of game theory models, we 
assume that doped and tested elite athletes will not be 
detected as doping athletes for sure in this time period 
because of imperfect Control EFficiency (CEF).  
Regarding time periods, we suppose two treatments 
concerning how to conduct doping controls. First, in the 
baseline treatment we require that elite athletes face 
doping controls in the actual time period only. Obviously, 
the Number of Controlled Periods (NCP) then equals one. 
Further, an objective likelihood of being caught in the 
baseline treatment depends on control efficiency, placements 
in rank-order tournaments, and numbers of tested and 
preannounced-tested elite athletes. Second, in the back-
controlling treatment we postulate that elite 
athletes are tested in the actual time period as well as for 
some time periods in the past. Thus, the number of 
controlled periods is now greater than one. Further, the 
objective likelihood of being caught in the back-controlling 
treatment depends on the number of controlled periods in 
addition to control efficiency, placements in rank-order 
tournaments, and numbers of tested and preannounced-tested 
elite athletes.  
Finally, at the end of any time period the anti-doping 
laboratory and the anti-doping agency exchange information 
on doping rules, the number of tested elite athletes (i.e. 
executed doping controls), Share of DEtected elite athletes 
(SDE), Share of DOped elite athletes (SDO) as well as Share 
of Detected and Doped elite athletes (SDD). Based on that 
information the anti-doping agency regularly publishes 
doping statistics and assigns fines and bans to elite athletes. 
Among other things, we describe in the following subsection 
how punishment of detected and doped elite athletes might 
take place. 
D. Elite Athletes 
We create ‘artificial’ elite athletes endowed with 
heterogeneous attributes to populate our agent-based 
framework. In particular, among the population of N elite 
athletes each one has ten attributes at any specific Time 
index (T), namely Identification number (I), AGe (AG), 
INcome (IN), Doping Decision (DD), Realized Rank (RR), 
PErformance (PE), FItness (FI), COnstitution (CO), 
DIsturbance (DI), and Behavioral-Type (BT).  
Identification numbers are allotted in the initial time period 
and remain constant for all future periods to identify elite 
athletes in computational simulations. For simplicity, we 
drop abbreviations I, N, and T whenever possible.  
An elite athlete’s age is assigned, also in the initial time 
period, to an integer between minimum and maximum age 
but in every period the population grows one period older. 
As a consequence elite athletes retire mandatorily after 
reaching the maximum age, i.e. their career in professional 
sports ends. Retired elite athletes are replaced by newcomers 
at the minimum age. During replacement all other attributes 
of newcomers are set to the initial values of retired elite 
athletes. Note that such a procedure of replacement ensures 
that the distribution of elite athletes’ attributes like 
Behavioral-Type (BT) remains identical over time and, 
therefore, allows for observing age-effects under ceteris 
paribus conditions. 
In each time period elite athletes compete for income in a 
rank-order tournament [31]. In such a rank-order tournament 
the income depends on elite athletes’ relative performance. 
Rank externalities in combination with the so-called 
‘superstar effect’ may result in a situation where small 
variations in performance lead to strong differences in the 
distribution of income [32]. Thus, we assume a prize-money 
distribution as follows. Winners of a rank-order tournament 
get a maximum prize of 1,000 Tokens and the next-highest 
finishers until rank 99 get a positive amount of Tokens – but 
less than each finisher’s predecessor. If elite athletes realize 
rank 100 or worse they earn nothing in this time period. 
Table II presents a non-linear prize-money distribution 
intended to be used for theoretical considerations and 
computational simulations. In particular, we make use of this 
prize-money distribution to provide a numerical example in 
the course of the paper. Nevertheless, to allow for a higher 
degree of generality we introduce a parameter for the 
maximum prize (maxprize) available. 
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An elite athlete’s income in a time period is calculated as 
follows. We suppose elite athletes have only one source of 
earnings, which is prize-money earned from successful 
competition in rank-order tournaments. Depending on 
Realized Rank (RR), any participant can earn a non-negative 
amount of Prize-Money (PM) according to Table II. An elite 
athlete’s spending depends on the individuals’ Doping 
Decision (DD), Doping Costs (DC) and proposed FINe 
(FIN) in the case of detection. Note that doping decisions are 
binary. We explain how elite athletes make their doping 
decision in the behavioral-type paragraph later on in this 
subsection. However, subscript ‘+‘ indicates that an elite 
athlete uses dope and subscript ‘–‘ indicates an elite athlete 
does not use dope. Thus, we obtain Equation (2) presenting 
three cases with respect to feasible income. 
FINDC
DCPM
PM
ID
IU
IN 











                          (2) 
First, an elite athlete dopes and remains undetected for 
whatever reason. Then, she has to pay her doping costs (DC) 
from her prize-money (PM+) so that she obtains an Income 
due to Undetected doping (IU). Second, a doped elite athlete 
is detected and as a consequence she earns no prize-money 
and has to pay a fine (FIN) in addition to her doping costs 
(DC), which leads to a non-positive Income due to Detected 
doping (ID). Third, an elite athlete does not make use of 
doping so that she can enjoy her prize-money (PM_) for 
certain. Note that we implement an error of the first kind if 
and only if control efficiency of the anti-doping laboratory is 
less than one. Further, we do not model an error of the 
second kind. To put it differently, we may find in our agent-
based framework a dope-using elite athlete who is not 
detected despite being tested but a clean elite athlete cannot 
erroneously be found guilty of taking banned substances. We 
adhere to this feature since an accused and innocent elite 
athlete may go to court and we are confident that she will get 
justice sooner or later. Moreover, intuition may favor the 
notion that prize-money is always higher when making use 
of doping than not. Note that this notion is not true since an 
elite athlete’s placement depends on her performance in 
TABLE II. 
EXAMPLE: PRIZE-MONEY DISTRIBUTION OF RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENT IN TIME PERIOD T 
Realized Rank 
Prize-Money 
in Tokens 
Realized Rank 
Prize-Money 
in Tokens 
Realized Rank 
Prize-Money 
in Tokens 
Realized Rank 
Prize-Money 
in Tokens 
1 1,000 26 135 51 63 76 24 
2 700 27 130 52 61 77 23 
3 500 28 125 53 59 78 22 
4 400 29 120 54 57 79 21 
5 350 30 115 55 55 80 20 
6 310 31 112 56 53 81 19 
7 280 32 109 57 51 82 18 
8 260 33 106 58 49 83 17 
9 250 34 103 59 47 84 16 
10 240 35 100 60 45 85 15 
11 230 36 97 61 43 86 14 
12 220 37 94 62 41 87 13 
13 210 38 91 63 39 88 12 
14 200 39 88 64 37 89 11 
15 190 40 85 65 35 90 10 
16 185 41 83 66 34 91 9 
17 180 42 81 67 33 92 8 
18 175 43 79 68 32 93 7 
19 170 44 77 69 31 94 6 
20 165 45 75 70 30 95 5 
21 160 46 73 71 29 96 4 
22 155 47 71 72 28 97 3 
23 150 48 69 73 27 98 2 
24 145 49 67 74 26 99 1 
25 140 50 65 75 25 100 0 
Note: Table II shows a regressive non-linear prize-money distribution used within the agent-based concept. We assign each realized rank a specific amount 
of prize-money in Tokens due to an elite athlete’s placement in the rank-order tournament. Note that if elite athletes achieve rank 100 or worse they receive 
a prize-money of zero. 
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rank-order tournaments and includes randomly allotted 
disturbance-effects.  
In this paragraph we explain an elite athlete’s PErformance 
(PE) used to model rank-order tournaments in the presence 
of doping behavior. Performance takes into account an 
individual’s FItness (FI), COnstitution (CO), and 
DIsturbance (DI). In addition, we need to introduce three 
related figures as real numbers between zero and unity. 
These numbers are Weighting of Fitness (WF), Constitution 
(WC), and Disturbance (WD). If a weighting factor is zero, 
performance is not influenced by the respective attribute. An 
increase in the weight of a factors leads to higher influence 
of respective attributes; maximum influence is reached at 
unity. To ensure that clean elite athletes can get only a 
preannounced maximum performance (maxperformance) we 
suppose that weighting factors sum up to unity. Equation (3) 
formalizes this weighting-condition. 
1 WDWCWF                                    (3) 
Further, we assume Equation (4) represents an elite athlete’s 
performance. 
DIWDCOWCFIWFPE                    (4) 
In the initial time period an individual’s FItness (FI), 
COnstitution (CO), and DIsturbance (DI) are randomly 
allotted between zero and 100. Thereafter, we suppose that 
disturbance is calculated each time period randomly, 
whereas physical fitness and constitution change due only to 
doping. Thus, a clean elite athlete can reach only a 
maximum performance of 100. COnstitution reflects an elite 
athlete’s physique in terms of long-term effects. For 
instance, we assume that Doping Harm (DH) affects 
constitution as follows. Effects of doping harm increase over 
time, reach a maximum, and then need some time periods to 
vanish. Fitness represents an elite athlete’s physique 
regarding short-term effects. Thus, Doping Efficiency (DE) 
affects fitness as follows. Effects of doping efficiency occur 
immediately at a high positive level and then need some 
time periods to vanish (see Table III). Finally, disturbance 
may reproduce an elite athlete’s fortune or misfortune in 
competition. Realized rank depends on an individual’s 
performance; in each period the highest value of 
performance wins the rank-order tournament.  
To provide an example, we assume that an elite athlete 
makes use of doping in time period T only. Further doping 
has positive effects on fitness for three time periods whereas 
such an illegal practice has negative effects on constitution 
for seven periods. Regarding strength of effects we introduce 
two related figures as real numbers between zero and one. 
These are Weighting of Doping Efficiency (WE), and 
Doping Harm (WH). Furthermore, we assign in Table III 
numerical values to these weighting factors. For a sequence 
of time periods we obtain then Equations (5) and (6), which 
describe effects on constitution and fitness, respectively, if 
an elite athlete makes use of doping in time period T 
   8...;;0,1
0
 

 atDHWHCOCO
at
t
tatT      (5) 
and  
   8...;;0,1
0
 

 atDEWEFIFI
at
t
tatT      (6) 
Of course, we have to adjust Equations (5) and (6) if elite 
athletes make use of doping in more than one time period to 
incorporate overlapping-effects. However, in the following 
paragraph we describe how elite athletes may behave with 
respect to making their multi-period doping decisions. 
We postulate four Behavioral-Types (BT) of elite athletes, 
namely, (i) rational-acting A-types, (ii) suggestible B-types, 
(iii) compliant C-types, and (iv) erratic D-types. Rational-
acting A-type elite athletes might make use of doping 
substances with respect to an expected utility maximizing 
approach. A suggestible B-type elite athlete is influenced 
strongly by doping behavior committed in her social 
TABLE III. 
EXAMPLE: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF DOPING IN TIME PERIOD T 
Parameter Weighting of Doping Efficiency (Short-term Effects) Weighting of Doping Harm  (Long-term Effects) 
Period T WE0=1 WH0 = 0 
Period T+1 WE1=0.5 WH1=0.25 
Period T+2 WE2=0.25 WH2=0.5 
Period T+3 WE3=0 WH3=0.75 
Period T+4 WE4=0 WH4=1 
Period T+5 WE5=0 WH5=0.75 
Period T+6 WE6=0 WH6=0.5 
Period T+7 WE7=0 WH7=0.25 
Period T+8 WE8=0 WH8=0 
Note: Table III contrasts doping efficiency and doping harm over time. While doping has a decreasing positive effect over three periods, the negative effect 
of doping increases from time period T+1 to T+4 and declines afterwards until it becomes zero in time period T+8. 
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network. A compliant C-type elite athlete accepts and 
follows strict announced anti-doping rules. An erratic D-type 
elite athlete wants to act rule-consistently but may commit 
doping unintentionally because of her ignorance of 
announced anti-doping rules or other misbehaviors. Note 
that these proposed behavioral-types stem originally from 
agent-based tax evasion models [33]-[39]. For instance, [33] 
makes use of an exponential utility function to model 
expected-utility-maximization behavior of rational-acting 
taxpayers. Thus, we transfer recent advances in tax 
compliance research to doping behavior patterns. 
Rational-acting A-type elite athletes constrain their doping 
decision based on whether taking banned substances 
increases their Expected Utility (EU) or not. Thus, we make 
use of an exponential utility function displayed in Equation 
(7). Distinguishing the doping use and doping abandonment 
cases, we aim to model expected-utility-maximization 
behavior of rational-acting elite athletes, that is  












PMRP
IURPIDRP
e1
)eSP)(1(1)eSP(1 
EU
EU
)(INEU     (7) 
In order to maximize their expected utility, A-type elite 
athletes take Income due to Detected doping (ID) and 
Income due to Undetected doping (IU) into account. Further, 
we introduce a Subjective detection Probability (SP) that 
reflects an A-type elite athlete’s perception of being caught 
as a doped participant. In the course of the paper we provide 
a numerical example of the maximizing procedure. 
However, note that the subjective detection probability may 
differ from an objective detection probability given by the 
anti-doping laboratory and the anti-doping agency. 
Furthermore, A-type elite athletes are endowed with a 
subjective Risk Perception (RP) to reflect their attitude to 
uncertainty. Subjective risk perception takes values between 
zero and unity whereby risk-seeking athletes have a value 
close to zero and risk-averse athletes have a value of nearly 
unity. According to [40] elite athletes become more risk 
seeking over time because of increasing opportunity costs in 
the course of their biographical fixation. While young elite 
athletes have more opportunities to find employment beyond 
professional sports, older elite athletes have often to persist 
in the system. A-type elite athletes are assigned to one out of 
four risk groups appropriate to their age. Table IV provides 
details with respect to classification of A-type elite athletes 
in risk perception groups. Risk perception is randomly 
allotted to elite athletes between the upper and lower 
threshold of their respective risk group. However, A-type 
elite athletes make use of doping if expected utility is higher 
in the case of doping abuse (EU+) than in the case of anti-
doping rule compliance (EU-).   
B-type elite athletes are suggestible and therefore their 
doping behavior depends on the doping behavior committed 
in their social networks. Therefore, B-type elite athletes 
decide to dope if at least one athlete in her social network 
dopes but none is caught as a doped participant. The size of 
the elite athletes’ Social Network (SN) is equal for all 
athletes. For simplicity we assume a ring-world structure so 
that an elite athletes’ I social network includes athletes with 
the identification numbers I+1, …, I+SN. If N is reached the 
social network includes elite athlete I=1 and so on until SN 
athletes are chosen. Note that [33] have used such a ring-
world structure to investigate tax evasion behavior in a 
society of heterogeneous agents. Reference [37] examine 
various social network structures and find that Erdös-Rényi 
and Power-law-distributed networks influence taxpaying 
behavior particularly strongly. However, in line with the 
literature we assume that a convicted B-type elite athlete has 
to act for a designated Number of periods Rule-compliantly 
(NR). 
Compliant C-type elite athletes act always and deliberately 
in a rule-compliant manner. That is why C-type elite athletes 
do not make use of a specific decision-making calculation. 
Erratic D-type elite athletes also want to act in compliance 
with anti-doping rules but may break these rules 
unintentionally because of a lack of knowledge about anti-
doping rules in force. The probability for such misbehavior 
depends on the Complexity of Anti-doping Rules (CAR) set 
by the anti-doping agency. For instance, CAR=1 
corresponds to anti-doping rules with the highest level of 
complexity. In this case D-type elite athletes are more likely 
to act against anti-doping rules. Contrarily, CAR=0 displays 
anti-doping rules with the lowest level of complexity so that 
TABLE IV. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RATIONAL-ACTING A-TYPE ELITE ATHLETES IN RISK PERCEPTION GROUPS 
Age (AG) Subjective Risk Perception (RP) 
                                   minage  ≤ AG <  minage + (maxage-minage)∙0.25 [0.75;1] 
minage+ (maxage-minage)∙0.25 ≤  AG <  minage + (maxage-minage)∙0.5 [0.50;0.75] 
minage + (maxage-minage)∙0.5  ≤  AG <  minage + (maxage-minage)∙0.75 [0.25;0.50] 
minage + (maxage-minage)∙0.75 ≤ AG <  maxage [0;0.25] 
Note: Table IV displays classification of rational-acting A-type elite athletes into four risk perception groups with equal intervals. The first 
column illustrates age intervals and the second column is associated with the related subjective risk perception interval.  
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all D-type elite athletes are able to follow anti-doping rules. 
In the latter case D-type agents behave like compliant C-type 
agents.  
E. Simulation Process 
Above we have described three interacting objects. The aim 
of this subsection is to depict the simulation process within 
which these objects interact. After running some initial 
rounds to create objects and to generate initial information 
we repeat a simulation cycle as often as required. Fig. 1 
illustrates this simulation cycle and its seven steps. 
As a first step, in each time period any elite athlete grows 
one time period older until reaching maximum age 
(maxage). On reaching maximum age an elite athlete retires 
and is replaced by an agent at minimum age (minage), all of 
whose other attributes are set to the initial values of the 
retired elite athlete to allow for investigations under 
ceteris paribus conditions. 
Subsequently, elite athletes make their doping decision on 
the basis of their behavioral-type specific decision calculus 
described above. Using the information concerning doping 
decisions a rank-order tournament takes place (step II). In 
the third step, a disposed ranking is drawn up. According to 
the rank-order tournament, all elite athletes are sorted 
according to their performance in competition. Both clean 
and doped elite athletes are listed on this disposed ranking. 
Afterwards an anti-doping laboratory executes an anti-
doping control (step IV) in which the preannounced-tested 
elite athletes are chosen on the basis of the disposed ranking 
and additional athletes are selected at random. Note that 
since doping test efficiency and frequency is imperfect not 
every doped athlete will be caught. Convicted dopers are 
noted and are punished by the anti-doping agency.  
In the fifth step, convicted dopers are removed from the 
disposed ranking and a renewed ranking is created. The next 
step is to distribute income to clean elite athletes and 
undetected dopers based on the renewed ranking (step VI). 
Thus, we make use of the prize-money distribution described 
in Table II. In the seventh and last step, the anti-doping 
agency announces detected and undetected extent of doping 
and other statistics. This information is used in subsequent 
periods e.g. elite athletes base their doping decisions on 
them.  
F. Illustration of Doping Decision 
We describe in this subsection the decision-making calculus 
of a rational-acting A-type elite athlete in the course of a 
rank-order tournament as an example. In this example, 
parameters and attributes are set to values as follows. 
 N = 100; WF = 0.5; WC = 0.4; WD = 0.1; DC = 100; FIN = 
200. Furthermore, let us assume we are considering elite 
athlete 23 (I = 23) and suppose parameter values in the first 
period (T = 1) are as follows. AG23;1 = 37; FI23;1 = 86.4; 
CO23;1 = 78.5; DI23;1 = 95.0; RP23;1 = 0.01; SP23;1 = 0.002. 
Inserting these values in Equation (4) leads to Equation (8).  
 
1.840.951.05.784.04.865.01;23 PE         (8) 
Moreover, we assume that elite athlete 23 achieves rank 
eight (RR23;1 = 8) with respect to her performance (PE23;1 = 
84.1). Using the prize-money distribution described in Table 
II, she earns 260 Tokens if acting rule-compliantly.  
Elite athlete 23 may increase her FI23;1 value in the short 
term by 30 percent (DE = 0.3) through the use of banned 
substances. In this case her FI23;1 may increase to 112.32 
and, therefore, her PE23;1 to 97.06. If her doping abuse 
remains undetected, let us assume she achieves second place 
in the rank-order tournament and earns 700 Tokens, but has 
to pay 100 Tokens for doping substances, so that 600 Tokens 
(IU23;1 = 600) remains. If elite athlete 23 is detected her loss 
amounts 300 Tokens (ID23;1 = -300). Inserting IU23;1, ID23;1, 
RP23;1, and SP23;1 in Equation (7) leads to Equation (9).  
957.0
)1()002.01()1(002.0
1;23
)600()01.0()300()01.0(




EU
ee
        (9) 
In the case of doping abandonment, elite athlete 23 earns 
260 Tokens for certain, so that IN = 260 is inserted in 
Equation (7) leading to Equation (10) 
926.01 )260()01.0(1;23 

 eEU                          (10) 
Since elite athlete 23 is rational and an expected-utility-
maximizer she decides to dope (EU23;1+ > EU23;1-). 
 
Fig 1. Graphical Illustration of Simulation Process 
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IV. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
To our best knowledge we have proposed in this paper for 
the very first time an agent-based concept to analyze elite 
athletes’ doping behavior. Varying parameters for various 
kinds of sport can be selected. Currently the computational 
simulation is in a preliminary state so that simulation results 
are not yet available. However, a benefit of such an agent-
based modeling approach is that doping behavior patterns 
may be investigated in a more realistic manner than with 
other methods like traditional game theory approaches. 
In theory we expect our basic concept to show that back-
controlling, i.e. doping controls with respect to competitions 
years ago, influences an elite athlete’s decision to dope or 
not to dope particularly strongly. Note that lapse-of-time 
effects with respect to doping behavior are frequently 
neglected in the literature. We think that such an agent-based 
approach may provide new insights concerning lapse-of-
time effects. For instance, deterrence effects that lengthen 
time spans regarding storage of necessary materials to 
conduct doping controls, e.g. blood and urine samples of 
elite athletes, are important. Moreover, interaction processes 
among elite athletes in competition may influence the 
effectiveness of lengthening storage time spans depending 
on behavioral type distributions in artificial populations.  
After generating simulation results, the next step in our 
research project might allow the sensitivity of various anti-
doping measures to be determined by varying the latter 
ceteris paribus. Based on simulation results we may 
provide policy recommendations to the WADA such as an 
optimal budget allocation for prevention policies. This will 
be very useful for future practice of doping prevention. In 
2014 a budget of 26 million US Dollar is available to the 
WADA, but the contributions of several anti-doping 
measures are still unknown [41]. Using an agent-based 
modeling approach, their efficiency and effectiveness can be 
estimated for the first time.  
With respect to extensions, we plan to implement a fixed 
budget for the anti-doping agency that finances various 
activities, e.g. control (delegated to anti-doping 
laboratories), education and prevention of doping behavior 
patterns. Within such an extended framework we can 
examine economic costs of doping controls and investigate 
optimal allocations of resources. In addition, several doping 
substances may be distinguished. The latter feature would 
lead to different detection probabilities and doping costs. 
Furthermore, consultants, e.g. team-managers or doctors, 
with an own advisor utility function could be implemented 
since consultants seem to play a main role in professional 
sports. Both outlook and extensions delineate a rather rich 
agenda for research activities in the future. 
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